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 ABSTRACT 
To mitigate a drinking water crisis in Kathmandu valley, the Government of Nepal 
initiated the Melamchi Water Supply Project in 1997, which will divert water from 
the Melamchi River to Kathmandu city’s water supply network. In the first phase, 
the Project will divert 170,000 cubic meters of water per day (at the rate of 
1.97M3/sec), which will be tripled using the same infrastructure as city water 
demand increases in the future. The large scale transfer of water would have far-
reaching implications in both water supplying and receiving basins. This paper 
analyzes some of the major changes related to local water management and socio-
economics brought about by the Project and in particular the changes in the local 
water management institutions in the Melamchi basin. Our study shows that 
traditional informal water management institutions were effective in regulating 
present water use practices in the water supplying basin, but the situation will 
vastly change because of the scale of water transfer, and power inequity between 
the organized public sector on one side and dispersed and unorganized marginal 
water users on the other. The small scale of water usage and multiple informal 
arrangements at the local level have made it difficult for the local users and 
institutions to collectively bargain and negotiate with the central water transfer 
authority for a fair share of project benefits and compensation for the losses 
imposed on them. The process and scale of project compensation for economic 
losses and equity over resource use are at the heart of the concerns and debates 
about the Melamchi water transfer decision. The Project has planned for a one-time 
compensation package of about US$18 million for development infrastructure 
related investments and is planning to share about one percent of revenue 
generated from water use in the city with the supplying basin. The main issues here 
are what forms of water sharing governance, compensation packages, and water 
rights structures would emerge in relation to the project implementation and 
whether they are socially acceptable ensuring equitable distribution of the project 
benefits to all basin communities. In addition, these issues of the Melamchi project 
discussed in this paper are equally pertinent to other places where rural to urban 
water transfer projects are under discussion.  
Keywords: Institutional Impacts, Water Transfer, Melamchi Water Supply Project, 
Urban Water Supply, Water Rights, Local Water Management Institutions, 
Kathmandu, Nepal 
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IMPLICATIONS OF BULK WATER TRANSFER ON LOCAL 
WATER MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS  
A Case Study of the Melamchi Water Supply Project in Nepal 
Dhruba Pant, Madhusudan Bhattarai,1 and Govinda Basnet  
1. INTRODUCTION 
To mitigate the drinking water crisis in Kathmandu city, which has resulted from the 
combined effects of inadequate water supply, increased water demand, and poor 
management of the available water resources, the Government of Nepal initiated 
the Melamchi Water Supply Project in 1997. This multi-purpose project aims at 
diverting water from the Melamchi River—located in upstream Mahabharata range— 
to the water supply network of Kathmandu valley2, and includes substantial 
rehabilitation and improvement of the valley water supply services and 
management. In the first phase, the Melamchi Project plans to divert 170 Million 
Liter/day (at the rate of 1.97 m3/sec, or 170,000 M3/day), through a 26 km long 
tunnel to be built in the Shivapuri hills, North of Kathmandu. The project envisages 
tripling the volume of water transfer using the same tunnel infrastructure as city 
water demand increases, with the ambitious plan of meeting the city water demand 
for the coming 25 years. The planned project cost is of about US$464 million, to be 
completed by 2008/93. The first phase of the project represents a case of both an 
intersectoral and an interbasin water transfer4. The project will, because of its scale 
and size, have large impacts on local water management and common property 
institutions in the Melamchi basin, the water supplying basin. This paper analyzes 
the implications of this project on local water institutions and local livelihoods in the 
Melamchi basin communities, and the related key public policies involved in a bulk 
water transfer project such as the Melamchi Project. 
                                                     
 
1 Corresponding author: madhu.bhattarai@netra.avrdc.org.tw.  
2 Kathmandu valley includes three major urban centers, Kathmandu, Lalitpur and Bhaktapur 
adjoining to each other. This Melamchi Water Supply Scheme (MWSP) is planned to serve the all water 
supply network of the Kathmandu vale, as well as newly developed peri-urban places in the valley.  
3 According to the recent communication from the Melamchi Project authority and others involved 
in the project, it is likely that the project will be delayed by more than 5 years of the scheduled time; 
this also means a substantial increase on the planned project costs. Recently, there are several other 
conflicts on implementing the project between Nepal government and ADB/Manila in relation to the 
privatization of the city water supply agencies. The tendering process adopted for privatization and 
contractual obligation of Nepal government and ADB/Manila—fixed in the late 1990s as per the 
circumstances of the mid 1990s—are being reviewed and reassessed in 2007. In fact, the Melamchi 
Project is so far one of the most debated water projects in Nepal.  
4 This project is intersectoral water transfer because water is being diverted from rural to urban 
uses, and it is also interbasin transfer as water is being diverted from the Koshi river to Bagmati river 
basin. Both river basins are part of the greater Ganga basin of the Indo-Gangatic plain.  
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This project is an example of a rapidly growing trend of intersectoral water 
transfer from a rural area to meet the burgeoning urban demand for water. In 
developing countries where the history of water transfer is not long, such large 
scale water transfer is managed and overseen by the Government. Although there 
are examples of water markets in South Asia, institutions that are targeted for 
managing the bulk water transfer across both sectors and basins are at an early, 
yet rapidly evolving phase. For example, in the last decade water markets were 
established in some parts of Tamil Nadu, a state with severe water-scarcity in India 
(Moench et al., 1999). There are major institutional and policy concerns related to 
large-scale water transfer projects such as equitable sharing of the resource, 
environmental justice, and overall technical and economic viability of the project 
itself. The public policy issues and concerns of intersectoral water transfer also vary 
by the scale of the project, location, relative water scarcity level, and institutional 
mosaic in the region (for case studies in South Asia see Moench et al., 1999). Bulk 
water transfer from rural to urban area also involves reallocating a high value 
resource from poor rural to relatively better-off urban regions in a country. 
Taking a case study approach, this paper illustrates the ramifications of a 
bulk water transfer on local water management institutions in the water supplying 
basin, and related public policy issues. In particular, it evaluates some of the 
socioeconomic, hydrological, water management, and livelihood implications of the 
Melamchi Project on the water supplying basin. This includes discussing the 
distribution of the project benefits across the basins, but also looking at water 
rights issues at local level and an assessment of the project’s planned 
compensation package. Finally, this study summarizes policy concerns and lessons 
on intersectoral and interbasin water transfers in the context of developing 
countries, particularly with the focus on threats to local resource management 
practices, compensation of local users and the processes involved in this. 
The field study in Melamchi basin was conducted using participatory 
methods. The primary data collected from series of short case studies in the 
Melamchi basin were later supplemented by information drawn from secondary 
sources. This was done by reviewing past studies and project documents in relation 
to this project and other related water resources documents in the area. The review 
also includes a detailed assessment of relevant government documents and gray 
literature, policy notes (regulations), and news on the Melamchi project published 
in the national media over the last decade.  
Following this introductory section, the second section of the paper briefly 
introduces the different components of the project. The third section describes the 
hydrological and socioeconomic situation of the water exporting region. The fourth 
section provides a brief overview of the laws regarding water rights and how they 
evolved, and the implications of the project on water rights in the Melamchi river 
basin. The fifth section analyzes the costs and benefits to both donor and recipient 
communities and the effects of the project on the livelihoods of local people. The 
sixth section discusses the proposed compensation mechanism, and the last section 
provides a synthesis and our conclusion of the study. 
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2. PROJECT DESCRIPTION5 
The Melamchi Water Supply Project (MWSP) is a interbasin and intersectoral water 
transfer project designed to meet the long term (over 30-40 years) water demand 
of three major cities of Kathmandu Valley (located in Bagmati basin) by diverting 
water from the Melamchi River located upstream of the adjoining Indrawati basin 
(part of the Koshi River). This is done by constructing a 26 km long tunnel along 
the Shivapuri range, with the capacity of 6m3/sec. In addition to infrastructure 
development, the project also plans for a comprehensive governance reform of the 
drinking water supply system of Kathmandu valley, which comprises the three 
major urban centers of the Kathmandu metro area (Kathmandu, Lalitpur, and 
Bhaktapur) and other smaller town centers in the valley. The location of the project 
intake and sketch map of water transfer is shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Catchment area of Indrawati River basin showing the Melamchi 
River and schematic diagram of water flow to Kathmandu valley and its 
location in Nepal 
 
Source: Devised by authors  
                                                     
 
5 This short project description is based on the recent update and publications of the project.  
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The MWSP comprises three main components: 
1. Physical Infrastructure Development. This includes the development of 
infrastructure facilities such as physical intake and river diversion 
structures, a 26 km long tunnel, 25 km access road to the tunnel sites, 15 
km of main access road to the project intake site, 22 km of approach 
road, a water treatment plant with a capacity of 170,000 m3/day in 
Kathmandu, bulk distribution systems (transmission pipe lines and 
reservoirs in the Kathmandu valley), improvement of the city water 
distribution network and its wastewater system, including the construction 
of wastewater treatment plants in the city.  
2. Social and Environmental Support. This includes project compensation 
programs in the Melamchi basin, which are grouped into three major 
categories: a) Social Upliftment Programs (SUP) for the Melamchi valley, 
b) Resettlement Action Plan (RAP), and c) Environmental Management 
Plan.  
3. Institutional Reforms. This includes reforming the present institutional and 
management framework thus improving the governance of the 
Kathmandu city water distribution system (HMG/N 2004). The major 
proposed institutional changes are: (a) promulgation of the Municipal 
Water Services Act, (b) establishment of the Kathmandu Valley Water 
Authority to become the owner of assets and to develop and implement 
policies for water supply and waste water services, (c) Amendment of the 
Water Resources Act from 1992, (d) formation of the Groundwater 
Authority, (e) Groundwater licensing in the Kathmandu valley, (f) 
establishment of the National Water Supply Regulatory Board, which will 
have the tasks to fix the water tariff and supervise the water authority 
and other agencies, and (g) the private sector led management of 
Kathmandu valley water supply. 
3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WATER EXPORTING BASIN: MELAMCHI 
RIVER6 
Hydrological 
The Melamchi water basin is a subsystem of the larger Indrawati basin, adjoining 
the Bagmati river basin, the water receiving basin. The Melamchi River has a 
catchment area of 330 km2 up to the Melamchi Bazaar area. A water accounting 
analysis conducted for a period of 20 years (1971-1990) for the basin shows that 
forestry accounts for most of the water consumption in the basin. The analysis 
presented in Figure 2 shows an overall scenario of water use in the sub-basin with 
and without the Melamchi water supply scheme. 
 
 
                                                     
 
6 A key feature of the Melamchi River in relation to the project impact is reported here. For 
detailed discussions, see Bhatarai et al., 2002 and Mishra, 2001.  
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Figure 2. Finger diagram showing water account result in the Indrawati 
River Basin for dry year (unit in million cubic meters) 
 
The average water flow in the Melamchi basin is about 10 m3/sec per year, 
and the planned water diversion of 1.97 m3/sec amounts to 62 million m3 per 
annum, which is about 10 percent of the average annual river run-off in the 
Melamchi sub-basin (613 MCM)7. However, measuring the water diversion on an 
annual basis means little in terms of availability of water for the critical period of 
the dry season, because of high seasonal fluctuation in water level. This is because 
over 80 percent of the water flows within 3-4 months of the monsoon, as illustrated 
in Figure 3. 
The monthly average river flow in the Melamchi River is no doubt higher than 
the planned water diversion. However, the average river flow drastically reduces 
during the dry season from January to May, when the demand for water is high in 
both the water supplying basin as well as in the recipient basin. The average river 
flow in the Melamchi River is more than 50 m3/sec during the three months of the 
peak monsoon season (between July and September) as shown in Figure 3. But, 
the river flow reduces to a level of 4-5 m3/sec during January to April. This is also 
the time when the water scarcity is acutely felt in both the Melamchi basin 
community (for dry season paddy irrigation, micro-hydro, and other uses) and the 
city water supply system in Kathmandu. After completion of the project, the water 
flow in the immediate downstream of the Melamchi River would reduce significantly 
during December to May (see Figure 3).  
                                                     
 
7 In the second and third phase of the water transfer project, there is another plan to divert water 
form Yangri and Larke Khola (rivulets) to the same project intake point to augment the water supply 
in the Melamchi River (see figure 2); detailed discussions are in Bhattarai, et al. 2002; and in Mishra 
2001.  
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Figure 3. Average monthly water flow in the Melamchi River sub-basin, and 
water balance at the project intake site after proposed water diversion  
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The project is designed to leave a minimum of 0.4 m3/sec as an 
environmental flow for aquatic life downstream8 (IUCN, 1999). This level was set by 
the project authority to meet the natural ecosystem requirements. The aggregate 
flow specified in the project document, however, reflects neither the temporal and 
spatial variations of water availability nor the “actual water uses/scarcity” scenario 
for various uses downstream. Some of the physical characteristics of the Melamchi 
River basin are summarized in Appendix 1. 
Socio-Economic Features 
The total population in Indrawati basin is about 40,000 (Rajkarnikar, 2000). 
Compared to the total annual water flow in the basin, the water requirements for 
the basic drinking needs of the basin community is minimal. In fact, for the drinking 
water, the communities depend mostly on 1-2 springs and river tributaries located 
upstream of the community (settlement) but not on the river itself. A majority of 
the farmers in the area are marginal farmers with subsistence farming dependent 
livelihoods, and only 12 % of the households own more than one hectare of farm 
land (Pun, 2001). During the dry season (January to May) the water flow is low and 
water scarcity is already felt. The project diversion may therefore adversely impact 
farmland located immediately below the water diversion point. The intensity of the 
impact, however, will also depend on the capacity and speed of the farming 
community to adjust to a new cropping pattern suitable to the low level of water 
supply.  
                                                     
 
8 There is uncertainty among the stakeholders and the water users downstream about the water 
availability to them after the project diversion. Information on minimum level of water to be released 
downstream of project intake point varies by the project documents, and the project authority has not 
specified it clearly to the basin communities as well.  
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Cropping pattern 
The farmers in the lower part of the basin (lower phant) harvest three crops a year 
(main season paddy, wheat/potato, and spring paddy), whereas those residing at 
the higher elevation can grow only two crops (main season paddy and 
wheat/potato) a year. The spring paddy in the lower elevation is of significant 
importance for tenant farmers’ livelihoods. The main season paddy production is 
mostly used for paying land rent to the land owner but the spring season produced 
paddy is retained as a tenant's share. Against the background of higher seasonality 
of water availability and huge implications of the project on community livelihoods, 
the next section will illustrate the current water rights system and the prevailing 
local water management institutions in the Melamchi basin.  
4. WATER RIGHTS AND WATER MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS IN THE 
MELAMCHI AREA 
Rights to use water in Nepal are governed by customary and statutory laws. The 
customary right over water is acquired through years of usage, whereas the 
statutory laws are approved by Parliament. An overview of the provisions of these 
water laws and how these laws have evolved over the years in Nepal are discussed 
below.  
Overview on Changes on Water Rights Structures in Nepal: Historical 
Perspectives 
The first concerted effort by the state to regulate social systems and resource 
management in Nepal was the promulgation in 1854 of the Muluki Ain9, the National 
code, to be applied throughout the country. Although the early versions of the Ain 
(code) had several provisions to regulate land rights but very few provisions 
concerning water rights, the later amendments (of 1952 and 1963) have 
increasingly dealt with the issues of water rights. The Muluki Ain of 1963 dealt with 
the issues of water allocation among several cultivators, construction of the new 
canals and responsibility for the maintenance of the canals. It accorded the first 
rights to appropriate water from a common water source to persons who invest 
resources for appropriation (constructed irrigation canals, water diversion 
structures, etc.). It also stipulated that irrigated fields that have been traditionally 
getting water should not be deprived of water by any other water project coming 
later on; and linked irrigation rights to land rights. The different versions of the 
                                                     
 
9 The Mulki Ain is a “public act” which formalizes different practices and norms on sharing 
resources (natural resources and other resources) in the country. The Muluki Ain of 1854, the first 
legal code introduced and practices in Nepal, combined ancient Hindu sanctions and customary laws 
and fundamentals of common laws, and was also then modeled on the British and Indian codes. This 
act codified rules of behavior that had evolved over the centuries in Nepal, particularly among the 
dominant communities residing in the Kathmandu Valley at that time such as Newars, Ranas, upper 
class chetris and Thakuri, and Bahun. In terms of irrigation cost sharing, the amendment of Muluki Ain 
in 1952 stated “tenants could be evicted from the land if they fail to contribute labor for repair of 
canals”. This was again amended in 1963 stipulating that registered tenants cannot be evicted from 
the land even for their failure to contribute labor for repair and maintenance of irrigation systems. 
(Khanal and K.C., 1997)  
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Muluki Ain do not clearly state whether riparian rights or prior appropriation rights 
should be given priority when distributing water across users.  
Other Acts promulgated by the government in relation to water rights and 
allocation of water resources are: The Canal Act of 1961; The Canal, Electricity, and 
Related Water Resources Act of 1967; Water Resources Act of 1992. By 
promulgating these several Acts the state has increasingly asserted its right over 
the water resources. The Canal Act of 1961 exclusively dealt with irrigation, in 
particular with state constructed irrigation systems. Through this Act, the state 
attempted to claim the ownership right of water sources and the canal structures. 
This Act also states that farmers cannot establish rights to continue using water 
from a government canal only on the basis of customary usage. Through the Canal, 
Electricity and Related Water Resources Act of 1967 the government further 
attempted to control and regulate water sources. The Act of 1967 made clear that 
individual and private water rights are secondary to the rights of the state.  
The Water Resources Act of 1992 is the first attempt to comprehensively 
address the use of available water resources in the country. At present, most of the 
policy directives and regulations of water resources agencies are guided by this act, 
which has in fact also vested the ownership of all the water resources present in the 
country to the state. Under this act, state is owner of all water resources. It also 
stipulates the requirement of licenses for bulk use of water resources except for 
purposes explicitly exempted by the Act. For the first time, it lays down priority 
order in water use. Drinking water and domestic use has highest priority followed 
by irrigation, agricultural uses, animal husbandry and fisheries, hydroelectricity, 
cottage industry, industrial enterprises, navigation and recreation uses. The Water 
Resources Act of 1992 has also recognized value of Water Users’ Associations 
(WUA) in managing the water resources and it provides a legal basis to WUAs in 
managing the available water resources locally. A registered WUA can become a 
legal entity and the government can hand over the ownership of water related 
infrastructure it has developed to a WUA.  
In addition to these statutory laws, customary laws coexist and also govern 
the water use at local level. For example, in most places of Nepal, customary law 
prohibits the construction of new canals up to a certain distance upstream of 
existing canals if water supply for the latter is going to be reduced significantly after 
the construction of the new canal (Pradhan, 2000; Pradhan et al., 1997). Generally, 
water rights in Nepal are secured through (Khadka, 1997):  
• Use rights acquired by investing in infrastructure. 
• Riparian rights that are based on the location of the land in relation to the 
canal.  
• Customary use rights and prior appropriation rights.  
• Use rights acquired through licenses with the aim to develop water 
resources for a specific purpose. 
In Nepal, the conventional norm of property rights in irrigation water includes 
principles by which both the water distribution and the responsibilities for 
maintenance among individuals are governed (Yoder, 1994; Pradhan et al., 1997). 
Collective decisions and actions of users define incentives in proportion to the level 
of contribution to irrigation development.  
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Generally, water rights for irrigation are closely linked with land rights, and 
individuals without land rights are not entitled for irrigation rights as well. In this 
system, the rights to use water lie with the riparian land owners. The water rights 
go along with the land rights, either to the offspring or whoever gets the ownership 
of the riparian land. Water rights are also linked to the tenure system. All the 
cultivators, whether land owner or tenant farmer, who contribute resources (cash, 
labor, or kind) for system development, repair and maintenance, hold water rights. 
Water Rights Structure in the Water Supplying Basin and Implications of 
MWSP  
Previous studies in Nepal (Dixit, 1997; Pant and Bhattarai, 2001) and in other 
countries of Asia (see Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2002; Moench, et al., 1999; 
Bruns and Meinzen-Dick, 2000) have demonstrated that the underlying structures 
of water rights are critical for assessing the implications of water reallocation 
decisions. This is also important for determining the level of project compensation 
in this respect (see, WCD, 2000). In this section, we summarize water rights 
structures commonly adopted in the Melamchi basin, and implications to water 
transfer decisions. Water rights in the Melamchi basin are generally governed in 
three ways, such as:  
(a) customary practice based on prior use,  
(b) physical position of the agricultural plots (priority for head-enders), and  
(c) social norms (based on social needs and value).  
Customarily, no new irrigation system can be constructed within 100 meter 
upstream of the existing intake, unless there is sufficient flow in the river to feed 
both systems. This is similar to the prior appropriation rights for allocation of the 
water resources.10 The most common prevailing customary basis for claiming water 
rights in the basin are: contribution for the construction of the infrastructure; land 
holding in thee command areas; buying of water rights from others (Pradhan, 
1989).  
The social norms of the area accord higher priority on water uses for 
irrigation followed by Ghattas—the water-operated stone wheel for grinding 
grains—and water mills, which use water-operated turbines for grinding grains and 
extracting oil from oilseeds. The installation of micro-hydro plants for rural 
electrification, in recent years, has in fact also reemphasized the higher importance 
of communal water rights over other minor private water rights. . 
At present, water from the Melamchi River is used for multipurpose uses. 
Some of the major water uses are shown in Figure 4. In recent years, some new 
water activities such as creation of micro-hydro power plant and water mills have 
been emerged in the basin area. Local communities have so far managed the 
allocation of water for various uses, following traditional practices. They have also 
devised complex water sharing mechanisms to deal with scarcity of water, 
especially during the lean water supply period from December to May. The users' 
adherence to their customary practices has been so far effective in containing 
conflicts between the systems in the Melamchi area. However, it is not clear how 
                                                     
 
10 In fact, this customary practice adopts mix of both riparian and prior appropriation based water 
allocation.  
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the roles and effectiveness of these institutions will be modified after a major 
portion of water is transferred out of the basin by the project. 
Figure 4. Flow Diagram of Melamchi Khola 
  
Tara Bahadur’s Water Mill & H P (non functioning)
Explanatory Note: Ghatta - Traditional water mill used for milling grains; Water Mill - Improved 
turbine type water mill used for several purposes including milling/grinding of grains; IP – 
Irrigation Project;  (P) – Planned; (O) – Ongoing ;  HP – Hydro Power.  
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Ret N. Lamichhane’s Mill Canal
Water Mill & 
Phatte Canal 
Murale’s Ghatta Ghatt
GhattGhatt Ghatt
Proposed Diversion Point for 
Melamchi Water Supply Project 
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Although customary practice would undeniably grant access to the river’s 
water to the current users, the enactment of Water Resources Act of 1992 has 
bestowed all the rights of water to the central government, which can decide how it 
allocates the water. The 1992 Water Act recognizes only the use right on water 
uses but not the ownership right of the local communities, unlike in other countries, 
where ownership rights are also usually exercised by the water users. For example, 
the legislative provision in State of Nevada in the United States prohibits inter-state 
water transfers that impact the current water rights (Booker et al., 1998). In the 
case of the Melamchi project, the government has decided to give the authority to 
decide on the water transfers to a government subsidiary managing the water 
supply in the Kathmandu valley. The water transfer may bring several changes in 
the water rights structures in the basin, some of them are summarized below.  
Customary vs. acquired water rights 
Bulk water transfer will have implications on water users who have acquired rights 
now from customary norms (or based on the traditional practices). In some cases in 
the Melamchi basin, the same canal water is used for irrigation, running micro-
hydro, and water mills. Both the micro-hydro users and the mill owners have 
obtained the water use right from farmers by priori negotiations and investment in 
major repair and maintenance of the canal. Micro-hydros, in addition to providing 
economic and social benefits to the community, have also provided new investment 
opportunities such as electricity based small cottage industry, electricity operated 
water mill, household use electricity related appliances, etc.  
In the scenario of reduced availability of water after the water diversion by 
the project, the micro-hydro users may have to forgo their newly acquired water 
rights from the irrigation users, as the low flow in the canal might not be sufficient 
to simultaneously running micro-hydro as well as irrigating the fields, especially 
during the dry season. The project could potentially thus affect the micro-hydro 
users downstream of the project intake site and their livelihoods. In case the micro-
hydro users decide not to forgo the electricity use then they may have to reduce 
water use for water mills and irrigation (for more details, see Bhattarai et al., 
2001).  
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Negotiated rights 
Mill owners are another group of current users who will be potentially adversely 
affected from the water transfer decision. The mill owners negotiate water rights for 
milling with the farmers, and the mill owners’ rights are secondary as they have to 
close down the mill and let the farmers irrigate the field during the time of low-flow 
in the river. Even before water is transferred by the project, there is water scarcity 
in certain locations downstream during the dry season.11 The planned diversion of 
water will thus affect operation of the water mills and it will impose direct economic 
costs to the mill owners, as they do not have ‘de jure’ right.12 In the case of 
reduced operation days of water mills, some of these households may have to 
travel to nearby villages to obtain mill services, unless the water operated turbines 
can be replaced by other power sources such as electricity, or diesel.  
Land-based rights  
The water rights in the basin, as in other parts of Nepal, are largely linked to land 
rights, wherein the first priority of water use is assigned to irrigation. In this 
context, the water diversion by the project will have large equity implications with 
respect to benefit sharing between land owners and tenants, who are usually 
landless cultivators; and between irrigation users in general versus other water 
users. The livelihoods of the basin community are largely dependent on the success 
of farming. A reduced availability of water for irrigation during the spring also 
means reduced opportunities for employment in the farming sector, and thus an 
overall loss of employment in the community if other alternatives are not provided 
in time. This is of significant importance in a remote mountain area like the 
Melamchi basin with already very limited employment opportunities in the area, and 
the only remaining option for these tenants and farm laborers would be to migrate 
to the nearby cities like Banepa or Kathmandu. The diversion of water by the 
project may lead to loss of agricultural income during the spring season, and of 
overall income of tenant farming households and farm laborers, unless other 
income generating opportunities are provided (for details on loss of farm income, 
see Bhattarai et al., 2005).  
Non land-based rights  
The prior water use right of Ghatta owners, although recognized in the community, 
is usually not enforced in practice during the lean season of water supply largely 
due to their lower social status and economic power in the community compared to 
the irrigated farmers and other well to do households. The Ghatta owners usually 
cannot assert their right against the powerful irrigation users. Given the situation 
now, the Ghatta owners’ livelihoods will be adversely affected if not enough water is 
ensured at the downstream of the intake point.  
                                                     
 
11 Despite plenty of water flows during the monsoon, there is a seasonal water scarcity in this 
remote mountain of the Melamchi basin largely due to low level of water control structures available 
there now (e.g. water dams). 
12 Water mills in the area are usually installed under bank loan scheme, thereby the lost income in 
the dry season caused by the Melamchi water transfer may adversely affect the mill owners’ 
repayment capacity. 
 
 
13 
The prior water use right of Ghatta owners, although recognized in the 
community, is usually not enforced in practice during the lean season of water 
supply largely due to their lower social status and economic power in the 
community compared to the irrigated farmers and other well to do households. The 
Ghatta owners usually cannot assert their right against the powerful irrigation 
users. Given the situation now, the Ghatta owners’ livelihoods will be adversely 
affected if not enough water is ensured at the downstream of the intake point.  
Melamchi Project Implementation and Local Participation 
In the Melamchi basin, water use is mostly based on informal arrangements among 
water users. These informal arrangements are working well at the local level, so 
until today there was no need to formalize these allocation rules, because of the 
small scale of activities and adherence to the customary practices among the water 
users. However, it is likely that this situation will not continue to exist for a long 
time, as some informal water management institutions are already threatened in 
their existence because of the external shocks induced by the project.  
The involvement of the informal water institutions and local elected bodies 
was very limited during the project design phase, especially with regards to the 
project compensation schemes. However, NGO participation, through development 
of an NGO Participation Plan (NGOPP), is recently being encouraged for 
implementation of the Social Upliftment Programme (SUP) as part of the project, in 
coordination with the concerned Village Development Committees (VDCs) and 
District Development Committees (DDCs). 
This, in fact, is an acknowledgement of the significant role of NGOs and local 
communities in project implementation, and is a positive sign in bridging the gap 
between the local people and the project management. Inclusion of civil society and 
local institutions in the construction and implementation of such large-scale water 
development projects is rarely practiced in Nepal, thus making the norms for local 
participation developed in this project significant in many ways. 
5. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF WATER TRANSFER DECISION 
Project Benefits to the Kathmandu City 
Our rapid assessment shows that there will be considerable economic benefits from 
the project for the urban residents of Kathmandu valley. For example, the economic 
value of the additional water transferred from Melamchi to the valley after the 
diversion, will be in the range of about US$22 million per year during the first phase 
of the project.13 When the project starts to operate at its full capacity by 2015 (i.e., 
                                                     
 
13 This is based on water service fees of US$0.40/M3 (or Nepali Rs. 30/M3 in constant price of 
2000) as set in the Melamchi Project implementation plan, and after reforms in the city’s water 
management institutions. This annual project benefit is derived under assumptions of about 10 % of 
distribution losses in the city’s supply network and after privatization of the city water supply scheme, 
and improved management of water supply scheme. Rehabilitation of the existing water supply 
scheme and reduction of water losses are components of the city water supply reforms scheme 
attached with the Melamchi water diversion project. It is expected that such reforms would reduce the 
present water supply leakages of over 40% to less than 10 % in the future.  
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0.5 million cubic meters per day, or 5.9M3/sec of water transfer), the gross water 
service fees collected will be approximately US$67 million/year.14(For details on the 
economic benefits of the project, see Bhattarai, et al., 2005.) These are only the 
direct economic benefits of the project to the water utility company in terms of the 
increased gross revenue, which is in fact only a part of the total project benefits to 
the city residents or to society in general. The total economic benefits generated by 
the project from improved water supply in the city, including associated secondary 
benefits (for example the improved public health benefits)15 would be much higher 
than the financial returns. Of course, this also requires large investments in 
infrastructure, and adequate operation and maintenance as well as management, 
including investments for wastewater management in the city. In addition, the 
project benefits generated for society also greatly depend on several other 
institutional and management reforms of the city water distribution system.  
The total societal level economic benefits of the project (accrued largely to 
the urban residents) will be about US$37 million per annum during the first phase 
of the project, assuming an opportunity cost of bulk water supply of US$1/M3. This 
is, however, only 50% of the current tanker supplied bulk water price in the city, 
and taking into consideration of project benefits only for 8 months of the non-
monsoonal season from November to June. The projected higher total societal 
benefits of the project (estimated at opportunity cost and taking into both direct 
and indirect benefits) than that of the direct economic benefits of the project (only 
from the additional gross revenue generated out of the volume of water 
transferred) is due to very high level of water scarcity level in the city (Kathmandu 
valley) now. The total project benefits (estimated at opportunity cost level) will 
however increase to about US$111 million16 per year after 2015 when the project 
transfers water at its full capacity (details illustration of these different types of 
project economic benefits are in Bhattarai et al., 2005).  
                                                     
 
14 The project benefits are estimated under certain assumptions such as: the projected volume of 
water diversion takes places; water service fees that will be set by the city water distribution authority 
as per agreement with the lead external project financing agency (Asian Development Bank); water 
service tariff in Nepali currency (Rs.) is maintained at a constant US$ value level over time, etc.  
15 There would be substantial level of secondary benefits by improving drinking water supply into 
an acute water scarce city like Kathmandu with over 1.2 million inhabitants. Some of these include: 
benefits from increased health and sanitary levels, and costs saving at the household level due to less 
use of energy for water treatment purpose at household level (energy price has doubled within the 
last two years) such as water pumping costs, water lifting cost, water boiling or treatment costs, etc. 
Likewise, project such as this will also have secondary costs (such as generation of additional waste 
water treatment costs). The estimation of all of these secondary benefits and costs (ex-ante impacts) 
of the water transfer decision are, however, beyond the scope of this paper.  
16  This is estimated by multiplying the annual water transferred (111 millions M3 per year, 
assuming 8 months of dry season and a distribution loss of 10%) by minimum trice of bulk water 
supply (tanker supply water) in the city now (at US$1/M3). In fact, many the private households in the 
city are already procuring the drinking water now from the water tank operated by private owners at 
more than US$1/M3, and the average household willingness to pay for the city water supply is also 
much higher than the currently adopted city water charge (see, Tiwari, 2000 and Whittington, et al., 
2002). 
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Economic Costs to the Water Supplying Basin 
One of the major economic costs (direct and tangible costs) imposed by the project 
in the Melamchi basin communities is the permanent loss of about 80 ha of 
farmland due to construction of the project intake site, an access road, and other 
infrastructure facilities. Likewise, the project will also lead to the displacement of 
about 75-80 households from their present location (Pant and Bhattarai, 2001). 
Due to the reduced flow in the Melamchi River after the diversion of water, about 
additional 110 ha of spring paddy land and nearly 15 Ghattas along the Melamchi 
River downstream of the project diversion site are likely to be adversely affected 
during the dry season (recurring seasonal loss). The Project plans to compensate 
some of the direct and tangible project inflicted losses such as land acquisition, 
damage of assets like house, trees, etc., but there are no clear provisions in the 
project compensation scheme to compensate for damage on non-land use based 
activities such as fishing, operating a Ghatta, or other minority water uses. This 
omission likely stems from the dominance of land-based property rights institutions 
in the country, and also highlights the lack of recognition of various other forms of 
water rights by the government agencies, as noted earlier.  
Our estimates show that the opportunity cost associated with the loss of 
gross returns of paddy in the Melamchi basin would be about US$350/ha/per crop 
season.17 The total economic loss of spring paddy of 110 ha downstream of the 
project intake, would be about US$39,000 per year.18 Agricultural production 
involves farm employment as well as other forward and backward linkage activities; 
therefore, the economic loss of not cultivating 110 spring paddy will be higher at 
the community level than the direct loss inflicted upon the farmers and land 
owners. This can be expected as loss of employment, a deterioration of community 
level food security, and loss of community level other related farm and non-farm 
employment  
The Project also adversely affects the Ghatta owners (and fishing 
community), who already have much less bargaining power in the community. 
Although these Ghatta owners have acquired water use rights by paying a monthly 
service of about NRs.10 (US$0.15) to the VDC, they had very little voice during the 
design of the compensation package program. Similarly, the fishermen living there, 
who sometimes earn up to NRs.500 (US$7) a day during November-January, voiced 
the opinion that they might not have enough fish catch in the future after the water 
diversion, thereby also losing a significant level of income. Under the existing land 
renting system in the basin, tenants pay all the income from their earnings from 
main season rice to the landowner and retain the produce from the spring and 
winter crops as their share of cultivating the land. This means that the tenant 
farmers would bear the brunt of reduced income caused by low water availability 
during the dry season. Given the history of project compensation in Nepal so far, 
these groups of users are not likely to be compensated for their loss. As noted 
                                                     
 
17 On the assumption of Nepali Rs. 1320 per Ropani of returns (in 2000 prices), and 20 Ropani = 1 
ha of land.  
18 During the spring season, some of these crop-fields may be, however, shifted from paddy to 
less water requiring crops such as potato, wheat, or maize, etc. Then the level of project adverse 
effects downstream will be certainly less than this.  
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earlier, most of the adverse impact of the water transfer will also be concentrated 
within 1-2 km downstream of the project intake site.  
The absence of an authority that could collectively negotiate on behalf of the 
local communities significantly affects the institutional linkage between the local 
water users and water management institutions and the Melamchi Project authority. 
Our study found that elected local representatives and local governmental agencies 
were also apprehensive about the central government’s overriding role on water 
management, and their underestimation of the role of local institutions like the DDC 
during the project design phase. Although the Water Resources Act of 1992 gives 
the DDCs a mandate for planning and development of the water resources within 
their jurisdictions, they had a minimal role in planning and development of the 
project. They could have played an important role in establishing linkage between 
the local people and the project authority.  
In summary, the Melamchi project has not given enough attention to the dry 
season water needs of the communities downstream of the project site. In the 
absence of a formal institutional mechanism, the priority for irrigation use might 
overlook the needs of other uses. The existing informal institutions might be able to 
buffer the scarcity situation to some extent, but it is probable that water scarcity in 
the basin may alter the existing informal water institutions and facilitate the 
evolution of formal water allocation institutions governing water rights among 
different uses and users. As management becomes intense due to the increased 
water scarcity, demand for more formal allocation arrangements would also 
increase, because users will have to draw operational rules for the distribution of 
water. 
6. MELAMCHI PROJECT COMPENSATION SCHEME 
The scale and process of project compensation to adversely affected households, 
who bear all the present financial loss as well as future opportunity costs of such 
decisions, are crucial to improve the total welfare and livelihoods in the water-
supplying basin and to ensure the overall sustainability of the project. Intuitively, 
project compensation is given to compensate losses caused by the project 
interventions to existing right holders in exchange of the use rights of the resources 
in question. In the case of an intersectoral (interbasin) water transfer project, the 
compensation mechanism, in principal, should cover losses of existing right holders 
of land and water resources who are adversely affected during the process of the 
water transfer. In the whole process, water rights issues are crucial, and hence 
need to be intrinsically embedded in designing the scale and the process of 
compensation structures in an intersectoral (and interbasin) water reallocation 
project. As discussed above, non-land based water rights should also be taken into 
consideration in such designs, in addition to the land right based compensation. 
The prevailing norms followed in the region give priority to compensating for 
damage to the land and land-based property, and other tangible damages, over 
other forms of losses. A project compensation scheme that is based only on land 
rights, or formal resource use rights, may, therefore, not adequately address all the 
externalities and indirect adverse effects (secondary or third party effects) caused 
by the water transfer, such as future loss of employment and loss of other water-
based business opportunities in the water exporting basin. In particular, the 
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Melamchi Project compensation package has not addressed the losses incurred by 
those who make an earning from the property of other right holders, such as tenant 
farmers and farm labor, fishers, and Ghatta owners. They may lose their source of 
livelihoods after the water is diverted. Considering the scale of additional benefits 
generated by the Melamchi Water Supply Project (increased water revenue and 
other related tangible benefits in the water recipient city, as noted earlier), it 
justifies compensation for both the direct as well as the third party losses in the 
Melamchi basin communities. And even more, such a water transfer scheme should 
provide a better path for improving the overall welfare of people living in the 
Melamchi basin, which is already a resource poor area compared to Kathmandu. 
The Melamchi Project includes a compensation scheme of about US $18.5 
million for general welfare improvement activities in the Melamchi basin to mitigate 
some of the economic, social, and environmental effects imposed by the water-
transfer project.19 The two major components of the project compensation package 
are: a) the Resettlement Action Plans (RAP), with a budget of US$15 million, and b) 
the Social Upliftment Programs (SUP), with a budget of US$3.5 million (MWSB, 
2000a; 2000b). 
The RAP is designed for land acquisition, resettlement of the households 
displaced by the project, and for provision of local infrastructure (access community 
road, school, etc). The SUP has been established to mitigate direct and indirect 
project impacts of the water diversion scheme and to provide a long term strategy 
for the improvement of the living conditions of the people residing in the Melamchi 
valley. The SUP has components of health, education, income generation, 
community development, rural electrification, and buffer zone management 
programs. 
In addition, there is also a plan to share the benefits of actual water volume 
transferred into the Kathmandu city with the Melamchi community at a rate of NRs. 
0.25/m3, i.e. about 1 percent of water levy collected at the planned water rate. This 
seems low considering the scale of benefits accrued to the city residents, and the 
permanent loss of water and other water-use related opportunities in the Melamchi 
basin. Still, this is a step forward, as there is no such provision of benefit sharing 
with the water exporting community so far. 
In 2002, the Nepal Government has set up the Melamchi Project 
Compensation Fixation Committee (CFC) at district level in each of the three 
districts where compensation will have to be paid. The CFC is comprised of 
representation from several related government agencies in the district, has the 
responsibility to look after compensation payment by the project. It has also 
formulated different sets of rules to establish land prices for compensation by the 
project. There are, however, some concerns among the local communities about 
the process of determining land prices for acquisition, particularly the exclusion of 
the Melamchi basin communities in the decision making process. Also, the 
bureaucratic process adopted for setting the compensation level was largely set up 
without any involvement and consultation of local stakeholders. 
                                                     
 
19 This comes to about 4 % of the total project costs (MWSP). Considering the current 
development stage and socioeconomic activities in the Melamchi basin area, this level of compensation 
package represents a considerable sum. 
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Lately, the project has started to involve elected District and Village level 
authorities (DDC and VDCs) in the implementation of the social activities (SUP) of 
the project. In fact, the local demand for project compensation was for 5 percent of 
the revenue collected from the urban water supply. At present, the local users lack 
appropriate institutional mechanisms to negotiate with the powerful government 
agency for compensation. Here, a greater involvement of NGOs in the project 
compensation activities and even of the elected institutions such as VDC and DDC, 
would help bring forward some of these coordination and benefit-sharing 
negotiation processes. 
7. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Melamchi Water Supply Project represents a situation that is becoming a 
common phenomenon in many parts of the developing world. Growing urban areas 
are taking water out from the rural hinterlands, and even from areas beyond the 
closest basin. Such intersectoral transfers of water will have large implications on 
underlying water institutions, governance, and water laws operating in a society 
(also see Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2002), even more in regions where 
agricultural productivity is already low and the agricultural sector in general is not 
developed enough to feed a rapidly growing population. What institutional 
arrangements are effective to handle such intersectoral water allocation process is 
however little explored issue in the literature (see Molle, 2006).  
The present case study shows that the multiple water rights exercised by the 
local people, based on the arrangements that have evolved over a long period 
independently of formal legal systems, are overlooked when large scale projects 
like the Melamchi Water Supply Project are implemented. In addition to economic 
issues of water transfers, we have analyzed equity concerns regarding resource use 
in such a water transfer scheme, and its implications for the functioning of formal 
and informal local water management institutions in the water supplying basin.  
The Melamchi river (and Indrawati basin), when measured on an annual 
aggregate level of water availability, is a water surplus basin. However, as in most 
of the monsoon dependent river systems in the Himalayan range, the seasonal 
variation of water flow in the Melamchi River is very high, and over 80-90 percent 
of total annual water flow takes places during the 3-4 months of monsoon (June-
September). The available information indicates that the remaining water flow, 
after the diversion by the Melamchi Project, in dry season (January to May) may be 
inadequate to meet the needs of the community residing immediately 1-2 km 
downstream of the Melamchi Project intake. The impact of the project further down 
will be less severe as several other streams contribute to increase the flow of the 
river.  
Our study suggests that the local water institutions in the Melamchi basin 
have evolved over a long time through agreements, various negotiation processes, 
and compromises among the various water user groups. A significant aspect of 
these agreements is to accommodate the need of various users and at the same 
time maximizing the benefit from the available water through various alternative 
uses. These local customs, traditional institutions, and Farmer Managed Irrigation 
Systems (FMIS) related institutions are capable of handling most of the small-scale 
water allocation issues. These same institutions have not been put through the test 
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of negotiating formal water rights along rivers and large-scale water transfers with 
a powerful partner like the Kathmandu city water supply authority (or the central 
water authority of the Nepalese government). A better understanding and analysis 
of these practices during the project design phase might have minimized some of 
the negative implications of the project interventions. Usually, the few powerful 
sections of the society are the ones to get compensated in such large-scale water 
sector infrastructure projects in Nepal as is the case in most of the South Asia (see, 
Dixit, 1994).  
Despite these potential challenges, the Melamchi Project has provided an 
opportunity to bring various stakeholders together to enhance their ability to deal 
with a seasonally decreased availability of water and to negotiate with different 
actors for a reasonable share of the benefits created by the intersectoral water 
transfer and to ensure equitable use of resources across the regions. The 
recognition of all of these minor water rights in the communities and compensation 
to the water right holders (including informally defined) in the case of Melamchi 
Project also reflect the success of the project in meeting local concerns, and not 
just meeting the demands and voices of a few powerful sections of the society. 
Locally elected institutions (such as DDC and VDC) and local NGOs have also 
been involved in the implementation of some components of the Melamchi Water 
Transfer Project, which is in fact an unusual case in such a large-scale water 
infrastructure project in Nepal, comparing to the cases in the past. Involvement of 
local institutions will certainly help in the development of more participatory water 
management practices in Nepal. Until recently, the mandate of locally elected 
institutions in water resources sector in practice was confined only to provide 
financial support to small-scale projects, despite the much bigger role assigned to 
them through the Local Governance Act (1998) in planning and co-ordination of 
development activities.  
The Melamchi Project has approved a project compensation package of US 
$18.5 million, spread over 7-8 years, to the Melamchi area and many villages there 
around to share benefits and to mitigate the adverse impacts of the project. Most of 
the activities under this package will be implemented under the authority of the 
District Development Committees. Considering the scale of long term negative 
disruption associated with the intersectoral water transfer decision, and the 
unpredictable third party effects, the nature and scale of the compensation package 
is quite important, and should not be understated. At the end, the success of the 
implementation of the project compensation scheme would ultimately determine 
the actual implications of the project in the water supply basin, and the nature and 
scale of the project’s impacts (positive and negative) on the society. In fact, the 
nature and types of water rights adopted in a society would affect how much 
compensation the water supplying community should claim and/or are entitled to 
get. The government policy designed to mitigate damages done by the water 
diversion should take into account both direct and indirect damages to the local 
communities induced by the project, and not only consider the direct project 
damage, as adopted by the Melamchi project case now and others in the past. 
In the literature on intersectoral water reallocation, it is commonly perceived 
that fixing the water rights would resolve the problem of intersectoral water 
reallocation and compensation to those adversely affected in the process. However, 
it is observed that a distinction has to be made between ownership rights and use 
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rights. The ownership right allows allocation, use, transfer, and selling of use rights. 
Use rights on the other hand are exercised by the water users only for specified 
purposes. The water users who currently enjoy customary ‘use rights’ occasionally 
also share it with other users, either for economic reasons or for a larger 
community interest, as discussed in section four of this paper. Over the time, such 
arrangements in turn can create disputes between customary right holders (such as 
irrigation users) and other types of right holders who would obtain their rights 
through negotiation. Ignoring these water rights issues can have severe social 
implications at the micro level water reallocation and households’ livelihoods. Water 
rights issues are important in two aspects. Firstly, contradiction on issues related to 
customary use rights and rights obtained through negotiation, either for the 
installation of water mill or for installation of micro-hydro plant, may lead to more 
water related conflicts in the future due to changing nature of the negotiation as 
per changes on the nature and types of technology and economic incentives of 
water uses by each types. Thus, it is important to ensure an appropriate balance 
among the customary water rights (for irrigation/ghatta), commercial water rights 
(for water mill), and social water rights (microhydro-electricity) by regulating the 
water management practices, which up to date had been carried out informally. 
Secondly, the livelihoods of poor households are closely linked to water right 
issues; as most of the rights of minor users (or non-consumptive users such as of 
fishing communities) are considered secondary rights that are not legally 
guaranteed by water acts.  
Among small holder farming communities, establishing effective water rights 
and enforcing them is also not a simple task. Despite a lack of stakeholder 
consultation processes during the design of the project, the project implementation 
process has highlighted importance of micro level issues. This could serve as a 
lesson for the design and implementation of other similar water projects in the 
future. The detailed implications of water transfer for the affected local communities 
can, for example, be better understood through a detailed micro level analysis. 
Likewise, unintended adverse impacts of this project have become visible only after 
the project is in full operation. A series of thorough participatory impact 
assessments, along with the standard project appraisal process (EIA and project 
feasibility), and a continuous and genuine stakeholder consultation process could, 
in principle, avoid some of these adverse impacts of the project.  
The intersectoral water transfer project produces differential level of impacts 
for the rural and urban sectors, and in the case of the Melamchi Project, the 
effectiveness of the water transfer decision can be assessed by analyzing additional 
value generated by the project, the process adopted for benefit-sharing, the 
governance of the project management, and the nature and level of compensations 
provided to the adversely affected households. Considering the amount of benefits 
generated by the water transfer decision, it is fair to demand that the project 
compensation scheme should be able to compensate for all the direct and indirect 
losers in the Melamchi basin, including those users who currently do not have 
formally recognized water rights. Otherwise, the urban residents will get additional 
benefits at the expense of already a resource poor Melamchi basin community, 
which may be bearing all the opportunity costs of the water transferred by the 
Melamchi Project.  
 
 
21 
APPENDIX A.  
 
Physical Characteristics of Melamchi River Basin 
SN Description Unit Quantity 
1 Total Length of River: Main stream km 41 
2 Tributaries No 14 
3 Catchment area of MDS intake km2 157 
4 Catchment area of River km2 330 
5 Catchment area of the nearest River gauge km2 122 
6 Elevation at Intake from Mean Sea level (msl) m 1445 
7 Elevation at tunnel end from msl m 1410 
8 Elevation at confluence with Indrawati river from msl. m 820 
9 Elevation of the river origin from msl m 5863 
11 Average monthly max flow at Intake  m3/s 10.92 
12 Average monthly min. flow at Intake (March) m3/s 2.55 
13 Average monthly max. flow at confluence  m3/s 76.00 
14 Average monthly min. flow at confluence m3/s 5.62 
15 Slope of the river % 12 
16 Distance at Intake from Confluence km 20 
17 Average annual rainfall in intake of catchment  mm 3212 
18 Average Annual rainfall in the Melamchi basin mm 3050 
Source: HMGN/NWSDB, 2000; and Mishra, 2000 
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